The context is that at the European Parliament and Council set out the key elements of a revision of the 2019 FDI Screening Regulation under a political agreement which aims at creating a more robust, coherent and strategic EU FDI screening framework. The core elements include: (i) a common minimum scope of sectors and targets, namely dual‑use and military list items, semiconductors, quantum, AI, critical transport/energy/digital infrastructure, strategic raw materials, certain systemic financial services); (ii) minimum procedural requirements i.e. two‑phase procedure, retroactive screening, (iii) harmonised deadlines, including a 45‑day initial screening and (iv) strengthened cooperation and information‑sharing, potentially through an EU portal and database.

These elements are clearly conceived as a “floor” for national regimes, with the political communication framing them as necessary to protect security and public order while still encouraging beneficial FDI.

The Emergency Romanian Government Ordinance no. 17 of March 2026 re‑engineers the Romanian FDI screening mechanism in ways that closely mirror the direction of travel in the EU Political Agreement.

First, it significantly broadens the definition of FDI to cover asset deals in sensitive sectors, expressly requiring clearance of any asset deal in sensitive industries, which corresponds closely to the EU minimum scope’s focus on targets rather than formal deal structures, especially for high‑risk technologies and infrastructures.

Second, it defines the list of “sensitive sectors” in a highly granular and, importantly, EU‑convergent way. It now expressly lists critical and advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors and components, cyber security, aerospace and defence technologies, which overlap almost one‑for‑one with the EU list of dual‑use, common military list items and semiconductor, quantum, AI targets. It also elaborates critical infrastructure i.e. energy, transport, water, health, communications, data processing/storage, aerospace, defence, electoral, financial and “sensitive facilities”, as well as essential land and real estate, again mirroring the EU’s emphasis on critical transport, energy and digital infrastructure.

Third, it adds detailed coverage of sectors such as (i) pharma listing the full vertical activities i.e. R&D, production, distribution, supply of medicines, devices and active substances, (ii) defence industry including dual‑use technologies and (iii) agri‑food sector i.e. domestic production and processing facilities, agricultural land, irrigation infrastructure, port grain terminals, silos, storage, gene banks, fertilizer technologies.

The first two sit squarely inside the EU minimum scope categories, while the detailed agri‑food and raw‑materials‑related elements clearly echo the new EU focus on strategic critical raw materials and food‑system resilience, even if not phrased identically.

The overall picture is that the drafter has taken the EU’s “minimum scope” categories and implemented them in a comparatively expansive manner, tailoring them to Romania’s risk profile e.g. strong emphasis on agri‑food infrastructure and land. This is difficult to explain without assuming close attention to the 11 December 2025 agreement and to the accompanying Commission narrative (were you thinking you would end this piece without reading this word?) on economic security.